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Abstract
Motivated by recent axiomatic developments, we study the risk- and ambiguity-averse in-
vestment problem where trading takes place over a fixed finite horizon and terminal payoffs
are evaluated according to a criterion defined in terms of a quasiconcave utility functional. We
extend to the present setting certain existence and duality results established for the so-called
variational preferences by Schied (2007). The results are proven by building on existing results
for the classical utility maximization problem.
1 Introduction
The optimal investment problem of choosing the best way to allocate an investor’s capital is often
formulated as the problem of maximizing, over admissible investment strategies, the expected utility
of terminal wealth. The formulation relies on the axiomatic foundation developed by von Neumann
and Morgenstern [52] and Savage [46]. In continuous time optimal portfolio selection, the study
dates back to the seminal contributions of Merton [38, 39]. In order to formulate the expected utility
criterion, the agent needs to specify, on the one hand, her preferences via the investment horizon
and the utility function and, on the other, her views about the future in providing the probability
measure to compute the expectation. The specification of the latter may, however, itself be subject
to uncertainty. This is referred to as ambiguity, or Knightian uncertainty in reference to the original
contribution of Knight [31]. It has been brought to prominence via the Ellsberg paradox [12].
From a decision theoretic point of view, the issue was addressed in the seminal work of Gilboa and
Schmeidler [22]. They formulated axioms on investors’ preferences that should account for aversion
against both ambiguity and risk. Specifically, within an Anscombe-Aumann model, the axioms of
von Neumann and Morgenstern were relaxed in that the axiom of independence was replaced by
that of certainty independence. That led to a numerical representation of preferences in terms of a
coherent monetary utility functional. The robust representation of the latter (cf. [9] for the case of
bounded random variables), then yield the following representation of preferences over objects X
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2within some set X :
X 7−→ inf
Q∈Q
EQ
[
U(X)
]
, (1)
for some von Neumann Morgenstern utility function U and set Q of probability measures.
This motivated the study of the risk- and ambiguity-averse investor who trades over a fixed finite
horizon in a continuous-time market model and evaluates terminal wealth according to the crite-
rion (1). The investment problem associated with such, so-called, multiple-priors preferences has
been well-studied. Stochastic control methods have successfully been applied and explicit solutions
obtained for the choice of specific market models and utility functions. Specifically, for stochastic
factor models and for non-Markovian models, solutions have been obtained, respectively, in terms
of PDE’s in [24, 42] and BSDEs in [40, 44] (see [17] for a full list of references). For general market
models and utility functions, we mention in particular the work by Quenez [44] and Schied and
Wu [48]. Relying on the results for the classical utility maximization problem in Kramkov and
Schachermayer [32, 33], the authors in [44] and [48] established a dual formulation and proved
existence of an optimizer (see also [5, 53] for the case including consumption).
The axiomatic results of Gilboa and Schmeidler were later generalized in Maccheroni et al. [36],
where the independence axiom was further relaxed. This led to a numerical representation in terms
of a concave monetary utility functional. Combined with the generalisation of the representation
of coherent utility functionals to concave ones, for the case of bounded random variables obtained
in Fo¨llmer and Schied [15] and Fritelli and Rosazza-Gianin [21], it implied the numerical represen-
tation
X 7−→ inf
Q∈Q
(
EQ
[
U(X)
]
+ γ(Q)
)
, (2)
for some penalty function γ. While the multiple-priors setup in (1) is a worst-case approach,
the appearance of γ enables the investor to weight the possible market models according to their
plausibility. This renders the presentation intuitively appealing.
The investment-problem associated with these so-called variational preferences has also been stud-
ied. Particular attention has been paid to the case when the penalty function is given by the
relative entropy of Q with respect to the reference model. Such criteria were introduced already
in the seminal work of Hansen and Sargent [1, 23]. For this choice, the problem is most naturally
formulated with respect to utility from consumption (or stochastic differential utilities) and the
natural tool is the theory of BSDEs. While a systematic study was initiated in [50], these results
have been considerably extended in a number of articles [4, 8, 13, 27, 35]. For the case of utility
from terminal wealth and general variational criteria, stochastic control methods have been suc-
cessfully applied for the choice of logarithmic utility. This for stochastic factor models as well as
non-Markovian ones; see [25, 26] and [34], respectively. General existence and duality results have
also been established for the variational preferences. Specifically, by use of similar methods to the
ones used in [44, 48], Schied [47] generalised these results to the concave case.
The decision theoretic results in [22] and [36], were recently yet further extended by developments
in Cerreia-Vioglio et al. [7]. Observing that all ambiguity averse preferences are axiomatized by
a weakening of the independence axiom (the coordinate independence axiom within the Savage
setting), the authors in [7] take this to its extreme by essentially removing this axiom altogether.
Thereby, a numerical representation in terms of quasiconcave utility functionals emerges. Recent
advances also yield robust representations of the latter; besides [6, 7], see Drapeau and Kupper [11]
3and Fritelli and Maggis [19, 20]. This motivates representing preferences via
X 7−→ inf
Q∈Q
G
(
Q,EQ
[
U(X)
])
, (3)
for some function G which is jointly quasiconvex, lower semicontinuous in its first argument and
non-decreasing and right-continuous in its second. Similarly to the multiple-priors and variational
cases (cf. (1) and (2)), these advances motivate the study of the associated investment problem.
The aim herein is to initiate such a study.
Specifically, within a dominated setup, we consider an investor who trades over a fixed finite horizon
in a continuous-time market model, evaluates terminal wealth according to (3) and maximizes this
quantity over admissible trading strategies. While the investor’s risk-aversion is governed by a
standard utility function, the ambiguity preferences are, thus, determined by a quasiconcave utility
functional. To the best of our knowledge, this problem has not been studied before. Indeed,
although the advances in [7] recently motivated the use of quasiconvex risk measures within the
area of portfolio optimization (see [37]) and quasiconcave utility functions have been previously
studied, the risk- and ambiguity-averse utility maximization problem associated with (3) seems
to not have been addressed. We note that the notion is unifying in the sense that all ambiguity
averse preferences, in particular the multiple-priors, entropic and variational ones, are included as
special cases. The class of quasiconcave preferences also includes interesting examples which do not
correspond to variational preferences. Among others, the so-called smooth preferences axiomatized
in [29], which amount to considering a distribution over possible distributions rather than a worst-
case approach.
Our results extend the ones in [47] (cf. also [44, 48]) in that we prove existence of an optimal
strategy and establish certain duality results for the quasiconcave case. As holds for the classical
utility maximization, the study of the problem within the dual domain offers various advantages.
Most importantly, in the case of robust preferences the dual problem amounts to a search for an
infimum whereas the primal problem features a saddle-point. Similarly to [47], we prove our results
by building on existing results for the classical utility maximization problem (cf. [32, 33]). However,
the quasi-concavity, as opposed to the concavity, of the utility functional, required a slightly different
approach to the one used in [47]. In particular, we obtain alternative proofs of some of the results
therein.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the market model and the investment criterion
are specified. The main results are presented in Section 3 while the proofs and further remarks are
given in Section 4. The proof of an auxiliary Lemma is deferred to the appendix.
2 The market model and the investment criterion
We consider a fixed finite horizon T > 0 and a given filtered probability space (Ω,F, (Ft)t∈[0,T ],P),
where P is the so-called reference measure. We first precise the investor’s preferences. Then, in
turn, the market model and the investment problem are specified.
The investor’s risk preferences are quantified via a utility function U : (0,∞)→ R, which is strictly
increasing, strictly concave and satisfies the Inada conditions,
lim
x→0
U ′(x) =∞ and lim
x→∞
U ′(x) = 0. (4)
4As argued in the Introduction, following [7], the investor’s ambiguity aversion is specified via a
quasiconcave utility functional. The latter is a mapping φ : L∞ → [−∞,∞] that satisfies quasicon-
cavity and monotonicity. Recall that a function is quasiconcave if it is the negative of a quasiconvex
function and that a function is quasiconvex if its level-sets are convex. For a function f : X → R,
that is equivalent to f
(
λx+ (1− λ)y
)
≤ max
{
f(x), f(y)
}
, x, y ∈ X . Hence, a quasiconcave utility
functional (the negative of a quasiconvex risk measure) satisfies
φ
(
λX + (1− λ)Y )
)
≥ min
{
φ(X), φ(Y )
}
, and φ(X) ≥ φ(Y ), if X ≥ Y , P-a.s.
However, it need satisfy neither cash-invariance nor positive homogeneity.
The specification of our criterion relies on the robust representation result (Theorem 3.2 in [11];
see also Theorem 7 in [7]) stating that every σ(L∞, L1)-upper semicontinuous quasiconcave utility
functional φ(X) admits the (robust) representation
φ(X) = inf
Q∈M1(P)
G
(
Q,EQ
[
X
])
,
for some function G ∈ G, where the set of functions G is specified next and M1(P) is the set of
σ-additive probability measures absolutely continuous with respect to P. Conversely, for any G ∈ G,
the function φ defined in this way is a upper semicontinuous quasiconcave utility functional.
Definition 1. Let G denote the set of functions G :M1(P)×R→ [−∞,∞] satisfying the following
conditions:
i) G(Q, ·) is non-decreasing and right-continuous;
ii) G is jointly quasiconvex;
iii) G−(·, s) is weakly lower semicontinuous, where
G−(Q, s) = sup
t<s
G(Q, t), Q ∈M1(P).
iv) G has an asymptotic maximum in the sense that
AM(G) := lim
s→∞
G(Q, s) = lim
s→∞
G(Q¯, s), for all Q, Q¯ ∈M1(P).
In particular, G(Q, ·) is quasi-linear and upper semicontinuous.
Combined, the above implies that we consider an investor assessing the utility of terminal payoffs,
modelled as random variables on (Ω,F ,P), in terms of a robust utility functional of the form (3)
with G ∈ G. For the specific cases when G corresponds to a coherent and concave utility functional,
the criterion reduces, respectively, to the multiple priors and variational preferences studied in
[44, 48] and [47]. In the same way as the study of the latter problems were motivated by the
axiomatic results in [22] and [36], the study of the more general quasiconcave case relies on the
recent axiomatic extensions in [7].
Without loss of generality, we may precise (3) by writing
X → inf
Q∈Q
G
(
Q,EQ
[
U(X)
])
, (5)
5where, for given G ∈ G,
Q := {Q ∈M1(P) : G(Q, t) <∞, for some t > 0}.
We stress that while U(X) ∈ L0 for the type of payoffs we are to consider (cf. below), the utility
functionals defined with respect to G ∈ G are defined only for bounded random variables. Indeed,
while the theory of quasiconcave risk measures has been extended to more general spaces, we do
not restrict to functions G ∈ G for which that holds. In doing so, we follow [47] who in a similar
manner studied the risk- and ambiguity-averse investment problem formulated with respect to
penalty functions associated with convex risk measures on L∞. In order to ensure that (5) is well
defined, we let EQ[F ] :=∞ if EQ[F+] = EQ[F−] =∞. Moreover, we extend the domain of G(Q, ·)
to the extended real line, in that we define G(Q,−∞) := −∞ and G(Q,∞) := AM(G).
Example 1. An example of preferences defined in terms of a quasiconcave utility functional are
the so-called smooth criteria:
X 7−→ φ(−1)
(∫
M1(P)
φ
(
EQ [U(X)]
)
dµ(Q)
)
, (6)
where φ is an increasing and concave function modelling the ambiguity aversion. That is, rather
than taking the infimum over possible models, the agent considers a distribution µ over them.
Such criteria were axiomatized in Klibanoff et al. [29] (see also [51]) under axioms stronger than
those used in [7]. Hence, (for bounded payoffs) these criteria constitute a particular case of the
quasiconcave preferences. The specific form of the associated function G is given in [7] and yields
further intuition for the criteria.
Next, we specify the continuous-time market model and the set of admissible trading strategies. The
market model is defined by a Rd-valued price process St, which is assumed to be a semi-martingale
on (Ω,F, (Ft),P). The price-process St is assumed to satisfy the condition of NFLVR with respect
to the reference-measure P. For given initial capital x > 0, and a predictable S-integrable trading
strategy pit, the associated wealth-process is given by
Xpit = x+
∫ t
0
pisdSs, t ≥ 0.
We denote a trading strategy admissible if Xpit ≥ 0, P-a.s. for t ∈ [0, T ] and denote the associated
set of wealth-processes by X (x).
In consequence, we aim at studying the following investment problem.
Problem 1. For given G ∈ G, we consider the risk- and ambiguity-averse investment problem of
maximizing the functional (5) over admissible terminal payoffs XpiT , X ∈ X (x). The associated
value-function u : R+ → R is defined by
u(x) := sup
X∈X (x)
inf
Q∈Q
G
(
Q,EQ
[
U
(
XpiT
)])
. (7)
We stress that the set of admissible strategies X is defined with respect to P, the role of which is
to specify the null-sets rather than representing the most likely model. In particular, we consider
a dominated setting in which all measures Q ∈ Q are absolutely continuous with respect to the
6reference measure (for ambiguity averse portfolio optimization with mutually singular measures,
see [41] and the references therein). Also note that while u(x) is non-decreasing, it need be neither
concave nor continuous (cf. Remark 3).
We conclude this section by defining an auxiliary optimization problem which will be crucial for
the analysis that follows. For Q≪ P, let
uQ(x) := sup
X∈X (x)
EQ
[
U(XT )
]
, (8)
where X (x) is as defined above. We also introduce the (dual) auxiliary problem
vQ(y) := inf
Y ∈Y(y)
E
[
ZV (YT /Z)
]
, (9)
where Z = dQdP , V (y) = supx≥0(U(x) − xy) and Y(y) is the set of all positive P-supermartingales
such that Y0 = y and XY is a P-supermartingale for all X ∈ X (1). Without further notice, these
functions will also be denoted by uZ(x) and uZ(y), respectively. While the objective functions in (8)
and (9) are defined with respect to the measure Q, the set of admissible strategies and dual objects
are defined with respect to the reference measure P. Hence, while it holds for Q ∼ P, that these
auxiliary problems are, respectively, the standard investment problem and its dual counterpart
for the market defined with respect to the measure Q, this need not be the case for Q ≪ P. In
particular, St need not satisfy the condition of NFLVR with respect to Q (see further discussion in
Section 4.1 and Remarks 4 and 5 below).
3 The main results
In this section, we present the main results. The proofs are given in Section 4. The following
standing assumption is imposed throughout.
Assumption 1. There exists Q0,Q1 ∈ Q such that
uQ0(x0) <∞, for some x0 > 0, (10)
and
G
(
Q1, uQ1(x)
)
<∞, for all x > 0. (11)
Note that assumptions (10) and (11) are disjoint in the sense that none of them implies the other
(although, they might both be satisfied for the same Q ∈ Q). Also note that (10) implies uQ0(x) <
∞ for all x > 0 and, furthermore, that Assumption 1 yields
u(x) = sup
g∈X (x)
inf
Q∈Q
G
(
Q,EQ
[
U (f)
])
≤ inf
Q∈Q
G
(
Q, uQ(x)
)
< ∞, x > 0. (12)
First we establish existence of a solution to Problem 1. The question of uniqueness is discussed
below.
7Theorem 1. Let G ∈ G such that Assumption 1 holds and assume either that
vQ(y) <∞, y > 0, (13)
for each Q ∈ Q, or that G(·, t), t ∈ R, is convex and (13) holds for each Q ∈ Qe. Then, there exists
an optimal terminal payoff Xˆ ∈ X (x) for which the supremum in (7) is attained.
We make two general remarks on the assumptions of the above result.
Remark 1. That G(·, t), t ∈ R, is convex is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the
associated utility functional to be concave. This class of preferences therefore includes but is not
limited to the variational ones. Nevertheless, the very same methods as introduced in [47] can be
used to establish existence for this case, cf. the discussion in Section 4.1, and in consequence the
weaker condition that (13) only holds for Q ∈ Qe suffices.
Remark 2. The assumption that (13) holds for Q ∈ Q implies (cf. Lemma 1 below) that Q = Qf ,
where
Qf := {Q ∈ Q : uQ(x) <∞}.
In fact, a sufficient condition for Theorem 1 to hold, is that Q = Qf and AE+∞(U) < 1. Indeed,
similarly to the standard case (cf. Note 2 in [33]), this yields the finiteness of vQ(y), Q ∈ Q. Yet
another sufficient condition is that vQ(y) < ∞, Q ∈ Qe, and that for each Q0 ∈ Q, there exists
Q1 ∈ Qe such that
EQ0 [U(g)] ≤ EQ1 [U(g)] <∞, for all g ∈ C(x). (14)
Indeed, (14) implies that uQ0(y) ≤ uQ1(y) <∞, where the last inequality follows from the assump-
tion. Hence, the conjugacy relations of Lemma 1 below holds with respect to Q0. This yields,
vQ0(y) = sup
x>0
(
uQ0(y)− xy
)
≤ sup
x>0
(
uQ1(y)− xy
)
= vQ1(y) <∞.
In consequence, vQ0(y) <∞ for all Q0 ∈ Q and the assumptions of Theorem 1 hold.
We stress that the assumption that vQ(y) < ∞, Q ∈ Q, is rather natural. First, under some
additional assumptions, it is established below (cf. Theorem 2) that the infimum and supremum
in (7) can be interchanged. In effect, the set Q can be replaced by the set Qf without affecting
the indirect utility u(x). More importantly, this assumption implies that the auxiliary investment
problem, itself, is solvable for each individual measure Q ∈ Q (cf. Lemma 1 below). As pointed
out above, the auxiliary problem is not a standard one. Nevertheless this might be understood as
an arbitrage condition put on each individual model (cf. [28] where it is shown that the classical
utility maximization problem admits a solution if and only if the market satisfies the no arbitrage
condition NA1). The assumption therefore relates to the interpretation of the ambiguity averse
criterion. On the one hand, the criterion (5) emerges due to the axioms posed on the preferences;
this via the robust representation of quasiconcave utility functionals. This motivation - per se
- does not imply that the measures Q ∈ Q satisfy any market related conditions. However, it is
common in the literature to also motivate ambiguity averse criteria by the fact that they, effectively,
amount to taking the expectation with respect to different possible market models Q weighted
according to their plausibility. While the weighting is determined by the penalty function γ for
the variational case, the function G allows for more flexibility in the quasiconcave case. Given
the latter interpretation, it is natural to assume that each market model Q ∈ Q, itself constitutes
8a sensible market model which excludes arbitrage. This is exactly what (13) guarantees. The
important question of how to ensure that this condition holds for specific choices of G remains to
be addressed.
Under the assumptions of Theorem 1, it is not clear whether the infimum and supremum in (7) can
be interchanged (neither whether the infimum is attained). Hence, there need not exist an auxiliary
problem (cf. (8)) producing the same investment behaviour as the ambiguity averse criterion (5).
This is, however, the case under some additional assumptions; we will come back to this (see page
10).
Next, we turn to the study of the dual version of the risk and ambiguity averse investment problem
(5). Specifically, we establish relations between the primal and dual problems and their respective
solutions. As holds for the variational case (cf. [47]), the study of the dual problem is, in fact, not
needed for proving existence of a solution to the primal problem. Indeed, the proof of Theorem
1 relies on properties of the auxiliary problem (8) and, thus, rather on the study of the dual
version thereof. Nevertheless, the study of its dual counterpart is of interest as it gives a further
understanding of the problem and of the optimal strategy. Similarly to the standard case, the
study of the dual problem rather than the primal one offers various advantages. This is particularly
evident for ambiguity averse preferences where the dual problem amounts to the search for a pure
infimum, whereas the primal problem features a saddle-point. In particular, most articles providing
explicit solutions for specific choices of utility and penalty functions, notably focus on the dual
rather than the primal problem. Hence, there is reason to believe that the dual formulation is
helpful in obtaining more explicit results also for the quasiconcave case. The results also enable
us to draw important conclusions about the optimal strategy. Specifically, regarding the existence
of an equivalent auxiliary problem and uniqueness of the optimal strategy (cf. the discussion after
Theorem 3).
We impose the following additional assumption.
Assumption 2. The function G is jointly lower semicontinuous and the level sets Qt(c) are rela-
tively weakly compact, where
Qt(c) :=
{
Q ∈ Q : G(Q, t) ≤ c
}
, t ∈ R, c ≥ 0.
Furthermore, either U : R+ → R+ or G(Q, ·), Q ∈ Q, is concave.
Note that since Q → G(Q, t) is weakly lower semicontinuous, Qt(c) is weakly closed and, thus,
due to Dunford-Pettis theorem, relative weak compactness is equivalent to uniform integrability.
Moreover, recall that for functions G ∈ G, G−(·, t), t ∈ R, is lower semicontinuous and G(Q, ·),
Q ∈ Q, is upper semicontinuous. Hence, the assumption that G is jointly lower semicontinuous
is, in fact, equivalent to the assumption that G(Q, ·) is continuous. Both these properties are
closely related to the fact that one considers (evenly) quasiconcave utility functionals which are
continuous not only from above but also from below and, thus, weakly continuous (as opposed to
weakly upper semicontinuous). We refer to [6, 16, 19, 20] for further details but note that this class
of quasiconcave utility functionals is natural within the present context. Indeed, in [7] the axioms
were formulated (including a continuity axiom) so as to render a numerical representation in terms
of such weakly continuous utility functionals.
While this (natural) additional continuity assumption is crucial for the duality results, the restric-
tion to positive utility functions is needed for technical reasons. The possibility of relaxing this
9assumption is left for future study. Note, however, that the results in, among others, [44] are estab-
lished only for positive utility functions. The restriction to G(Q, ·) concave yields, essentially, the
variational case treated in [47]. It is included as a specific case in order to compare our methods
and relate our results to the ones therein.
Theorem 2. Let G ∈ G such that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then,
i) the robust value-function satisfies
u(x) := sup
X∈X (x)
inf
Q∈Q
G
(
Q,EQ
[
U(XT )
])
= inf
Q∈Q
sup
X∈X (x)
G
(
Q,EQ
[
U(XT )
])
, (15)
and, furthermore,
u(x) = inf
y>0
v(y;x), (16)
where v(y;x) is the dual value function given by
v(y;x) := inf
Q∈Q
G
(
Q, vQ(y) + xy
)
. (17)
ii) Moreover, if v(y;x) <∞, then the dual problem (17) admits a solution (Q̂, Ŷ ) that is maximal
in the sense that any other solution (Q, Y ) satisfies Q≪ Q̂ and YT /Z = ŶT /Ẑ, Q-a.s.
While the above result imposes stronger conditions on the structural properties of G (and U) than
needed for Theorem 1, finiteness assumptions of the type needed for the existence are not required
here. This should be related to the results in [32, 33], where the conjugacy relations are proven
under much weaker conditions than needed for the existence.
For the variational case, the relation between the primal and dual value function (cf. (16)) was
established in [47] under the additional assumptions that uQ0(x) <∞ for some Q0 ∈ Qe and
v(y;x) <∞ implies vQ1(y) <∞ for some Q1 ∈ Qe. (18)
Although very natural, this assumption is, in fact, not needed. However, for the variational case, a
slightly stronger result can be proven under this additional assumption; cf. Remark 5 below.
The next result relates the respective solutions to the primal and dual problems. In particular, the
result yields the existence of an equivalent auxiliary problem and results on the uniqueness of the
optimal strategy.
Theorem 3. Let G ∈ G and assume Assumption 2 and the assumptions of Theorem 1 to hold. Let
X¯ be a solution to the primal problem. Then, the primal problem admits a saddle point (X¯, Q¯) and
there exists y∗ > 0 for which the infimum in (16) is attained.
Assume, furthermore, that G(Q, ·), Q ∈ Q, is strictly increasing and let (Ŷ , Q̂) be any solution to
the dual problem at level y∗. Then, (X¯, Q̂) is a saddle point for the primal problem and, moreover,
X¯ = I(ŶT /Ẑ), Q̂-a.s. (19)
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The above result is of particular interest as it gives a further understanding of the optimal strategy.
Let Q̂ be the measure in the maximal solution to the dual (or, equivalently, primal) problem.
Following the related literature, we refer to it as the least favourable measure. Relation (19) then
implies that the optimal solution X̂T , in fact, is Q̂-a.s. unique. Consequently, if the least favourable
measure is equivalent to P, the solution is P-a.s. unique. In particular, it can then be recovered
from the dual solution. In general, the least favourable measure need however not be equivalent
to P. Nevertheless, an optimal strategy can still be constructed from a given solution of the dual
problem by superhedging of an appropriate claim (cf. Corollary 2.7 in [47]).
The existence of a saddle point also implies that, a posteriori, there exists an auxiliary investment
problem (8) producing the same optimal behaviour as the original criterion (in particular, this al-
ways holds for the variational criteria). Specifically, the auxiliary problem defined with respect to
the least favourable measure Q̂ admits a solution (cf. Lemma 1 below) which Q̂-a.s. coincides with
the solution to the original problem. Since the least-favourable measure is part of the solution to
the original problem, the equivalence between the ambiguity averse and the auxiliary problem is an
a posteriori result. Given the existence of an auxiliary problem (for which the objective function is
concave), the Q̂-a.s. uniqueness of the optimal strategy is natural. Under the weaker assumptions
of Theorem 1, it is not clear though whether an equivalent auxiliary problem exists (cf. the discus-
sion on page 8). The question of to which extent uniqueness holds under more general assumptions
(given G(Q, ·) strictly increasing) is left for future study.
Remark 3 (Time consistency). In general, Problem 1 is not a time-consistent investment problem
(see [47] for counter-examples in the variational case). A natural question is therefore under what
assumptions it is. Indeed, while time-consistency is of interest in its own right, it is also of essential
importance as it enables the use of stochastic control methods. In consequence, it is a prerequisite
for extending to the quasiconcave case the explicit results obtained in terms of PDEs and BSDEs
for the variational preferences (cf. the references in the Introduction). Time consistency of quasi-
concave utility functionals (quasiconvex risk measures) remains, however, an open problem and, in
particular, feasible explicit examples are few. Indeed, while necessary and sufficient conditions for
temporal consistency of convex risk measures were established in [10] (see also [3] and [14]), such
results are, yet, lacking for the quasiconvex case. In recent work, [19, 20] initiated such a programme
via the study of conditional quasiconvex risk measures. Questions of temporal consistency and the
relation to g-expectations have also been studied within the more general framework of non-linear
expectations in [43].
We also note that in (7), the risk preferences of the investor are modelled via a standard continuous
and concave utility function. While this assumption makes perfect sense for the static problem,
the value function u(x) will only satisfy weaker properties (a more precise study of the properties
of the value function is left for future study). Hence, a study of time-consistent problems of this
type also requires a study of the risk and ambiguity averse investment problem (7) under weaker
assumptions on U(x). In summary, while questions of time-consistency are of great interest, they
impose challenging additional problems which are left for future study.
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4 Proofs
The above theorems extend results established for the variational preferences in [47] (cf. [44, 48] for
the coherent case) to the quasiconcave risk- and ambiguity-averse investment criteria. Naturally,
our proofs are therefore inspired by and in many ways similar to those in the former articles.
Specifically, also here the idea is to establish results for the risk- and ambiguity-averse problem by
relying on existing results for the auxiliary problem (8). As pointed out above, for Q ∼ P, this
is the classical utility maximization problem as studied in [32, 33]. For Q ≪ P, this need not be
the case. In [47], this is dealt with by use of certain limiting arguments. However, for our case,
the weaker properties of G imply that this approach does not apply. Hence the need for somewhat
different arguments.
In Section 4.1, we explain why we were not able to directly apply the arguments developed in [47]
and describe the approach we use in further detail. This illustrates the differences in the required
assumptions. The existence and duality results are proven, respectively, in Sections 4.2 and 4.3.
The proof of Lemma 1 below is deferred to the Appendix.
4.1 The auxiliary problem and its significance
For the variational case studied in [47], the appearance of measures in Q which are absolutely
continuous but not necessarily equivalent to P, is addressed in the following way. For Q0 ∈ Q\Qe,
the authors let Q1 ∈ Qe and define the measures Qt, t ∈ [0, 1], via the Radon-Nikodym derivative
Zt := (1− t)Z0 + tZ1, where Z0 and Z1 correspond, respectively, to Q0 and Q1. Then, Qt ∈ Qe for
t ∈ (0, 1]. Moreover, under suitable finiteness-assumptions, the functions
t→ G
(
Qt, uQt(x)
)
and t→ G
(
Qt, vQt(y) + xy
)
, (20)
are continuous and upper semicontinuous, respectively. Combined, this implies that the results
can be established by relying on results for auxiliary problems (cf. (8)) defined with respect to
measures equivalent to P only. To the latter, the results in [32, 33] can, in turn, be directly applied.
In consequence, certain assumptions need only be posed on the set of measures Qe as opposed to Q
(cf. Theorem 1). This approach is closely related to the fact that the set of absolutely continuous
measures in the representation of a concave utility functional, under the assumption that there
exists an equivalent measure for which the penalty is finite, can be replaced by the equivalent ones;
cf. [30].
The continuity properties in (20) rely, however, on the fact that for the variational case G(·, t) =
γ(·) + t and, thus, the mapping is convex. Indeed, this implies that the mapping
t→ G(Zt, s), t ∈ [0, 1], s ∈ R, (21)
is convex as well. If it is finite, it is therefore upper-semicontinuous. According to Lemma 3.3
in [48], t → uZt(x) is continuous and, under rather weak assumptions, also t → vZt(y) is upper
semicontinuous. Hence, (under suitable finiteness assumptions) the required continuity properties in
(20) follow. The crucial point is that for the quasiconcave case we consider, the functionG(·, t) might
not be convex. Therefore, the continuity properties in (20) might not hold and, in consequence, the
arguments developed in [47] do not apply.
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Our methods are rather based on a closer study of the auxiliary problem (8). Although not a
standard problem, it is, in fact, only a minor modification thereof and can therefore be solved by
use of the same methods as developed in [32] (cf. Lemma 1 below). By use of this observation, we
then address the risk and ambiguity averse investment problem. In particular, we obtain alternative
proofs of some results established in [47]. Indeed, once the relevant properties have been obtained
for auxiliary problems with Q≪ P, the proofs can be simplified. In particular, our approach enables
establishing the relation between the primal and dual value functions (cf. (16) below) under slightly
weaker assumptions than in [47]. However, for the existence of an optimizer, stronger assumptions
are required. These assumptions, which are a consequence of the more general type of criteria we
consider, are still economically feasible; see the discussion after Theorem 1 above.
The properties of the auxiliary problem that will be made use of are presented next.
Lemma 1. Let U satisfy the Inada conditions (cf. (4)) and assume uZ(x0) <∞ for some x0 > 0.
Then, the function uZ(x) and vZ(y) defined, respectively, in (8) and (9) satisfy the following:
i) It holds that
vZ(y) = sup
x>0
(
uZ(x)− xy
)
and uZ(y) = inf
y>0
(
vZ(x) + xy
)
,
and, furthermore,
u′Z(0) =∞ and v
′
Z(∞) = 0.
ii) Under the additional assumption that vZ(y) <∞, y > 0, it also holds that
u′Z(∞) = 0 and v
′
Z(0) = −∞.
Moreover, the set {ZU+(g) : g ∈ C(x)} is P-UI and the primal problem admits a solution.
For Q ∼ P, the above result was established in [32, 33]. For Q≪ P, note that while the objective in
the auxiliary problem is defined with respect to the measure Q, the set of strategies is still defined
in the standard way with respect to the reference measure P. This is the key reason for the above
result to hold also for auxiliary problems defined with respect to Q≪ P (cf. also Remark 5). Indeed,
the proofs in [32, 33] make use of the assumption of NFLVR in order to treat the strategies (via the
characterization in (40) below), not the objective function. In consequence, Lemma 1 follows by
minor modifications the respective proofs in [32, 33]. For completeness, the details are presented
in the Appendix. We note that the auxiliary problem also might be viewed as utility maximization
under P with respect to the stochastic utility function U˜(x) = ZTU(x) and refer to, among others,
[18] for alternative arguments. For an economic interpretation of the condition that uZ(x0) < ∞,
see the discussion on p. 7.
4.2 Proof of the existence of an optimal investment strategy
The proof first establishes upper semicontinuity and quasi-concavity of the objective function. The
existence of an optimizer then follows by use of a Komlos-type argument.
Proof of Theorem 1. For the case when G(·, t) is convex, we refer to Lemma 4.7 in [47]. Note that
the optimization overX ∈ X (x) can be replaced by optimization over the set C(x) := {g ∈ L0+(FT ) :
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g ≤ XT , X ∈ X (x)} of random variables. That is to say,
u(x) = sup
g∈C(x)
inf
Q∈Q
G
(
Q,EQ
[
U
(
g
)])
. (22)
Due to assumption (13), uQ(x) <∞, Q ∈ Q, (cf. Lemma 3.5 in [48]) and Lemma 1 applies. Hence,
{U+(f)}, f ∈ C(x) is Q-UI, Q ∈ Q. Combined with an application of Fatou’s Lemma to the
negative part U−(f), this yields that g → EQ[U(g)], g ∈ C(x), is upper semicontinuous for Q ∈ Q.
Since also G(Z, ·) is upper semicontinuous and the pointwise infimum of u.s.c. functionals is again
u.s.c., it follows that the mapping
g → V (g) := inf
Q∈Q
G
(
Q,EQ[U(g)]
)
, g ∈ C(x), (23)
is upper semicontinuous as well. Moreover, as g → E[ZU(f)] is concave, G(Z, ·) is quasi-linear and
the point-wise infimum of quasiconcave functionals is again quasiconcave, it follows that g → V (g)
is quasiconcave. More precisely, the semicontinuity and quasi-concavity can be argued as follows.
Since t → G(q, t) is non-decreasing and right-continuous, it holds according to Proposition B.2 in
[11] that
G(q, t) ≥ m if and only if t ≥ G(−1,l)(q,m),
where the left inverse is given by G(−1,l)(q,m) = inf{n ∈ R : G(q,m) ≥ n}. Consequently, the
following holds:{
g ∈ C(x) : G
(
q, 〈U(g), q〉
)
≥ m
}
=
{
g ∈ C(x) : 〈q, U(g)〉 ≥ G(−1,l)(q,m)
}
. (24)
This level set is then closed and convex since g → 〈q, U(g)〉, g ∈ C(x), q ∈ Q, is concave and upper
semicontinuous according to the above. Then, in turn, it follows that the set{
g ∈ C(x) : V (g) ≥ m
}
= ∩q∈Q
{
g ∈ C(x) : G
(
q, 〈U(g), q〉
)
≥ m
}
,
is closed and convex and, thus, that g → V (g) is upper semicontinuous and quasiconcave.
The existence of an optimizer now follows by a standard Komlos-type argument. Indeed, let (gn)
be a sequence in C(x) such that V (gn) ր u(x). Since each gn ≥ 0, Komlos Lemma gives g˜n ∈
conv(gn, gn+1, ...) converging P-a.s. to some g. Since C(x) is convex, g˜n ∈ C(x). Furthermore,
according to Proposition 3.1 in [32], C(x) is closed under convergence in L0 and, thus, g ∈ C(x).
Next, due to the quasi-concavity of g → V (g) it holds that
V (g˜n) = V
(∑
k≥n
λkgk
)
≥ inf
k≥n
V (gk) = V (gn).
Since V (g˜n) ≤ u(x) and V (gn) ր u(x) it, thus, follows that limn→∞ V (g˜n) = u(x); that is to say,
g˜n is an optimizing sequence. Then, in turn, the upper semi-continuity of g → V (g) yields that
V (g) ≥ lim sup
n→∞
V (g˜n) = u(x),
which concludes the proof.
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4.3 Proof of the duality results
For the proof of Theorem 2, note that since G(Z, ·) is non-decreasing, it immediately follows
that
u(x) ≤ inf
Q∈Q
G
(
Q, uQ(x)
)
≤ inf
Q∈Q
G
(
Q, vQ(y) + xy
)
= v(y;x), for all y > 0. (25)
The proof verifies that the inequalities, in fact, are equalities by use of, respectively, Sion’s minimax
theorem and Lemma 1.
Proof of Theorem 2. Part i) For the case whenG(Z, ·) is concave and U : R+ → R+ let, respectively,
ε > 0 and ε = 0. According to (12), u(x) <∞, x > 0. Hence, for each g ∈ C(x),
inf
Z∈Q
G
(
Z,E
[
ZU (ε+ g)
])
≤ sup
g∈C(x)
inf
Z∈Q
G
(
Z,E
[
ZU (ε+ g)
])
≤ u(x+ ε) <∞.
Consequently,
inf
Z∈Q
G
(
Z,E
[
ZU (ε+ g)
])
= inf
Z∈Q˜
G
(
Z,E
[
ZU (ε+ g)
])
, (26)
where Q˜ is the set of measures inQ for whichG
(
Z,E[ZU(ε+g)]
)
≤ u(x+ε)+1. Since E[ZU(ε+g)] ≥
U(ε)∧0, for Z ∈ Q, it holds for each Z ∈ Q˜ that G(Z, t) ≤ c for t := U(ε)∧0 and c := u(x+ ε)+1.
Hence, Q˜ in (26) might be replaced by Qt(c). Since this holds for each g ∈ C(x), it thus follows
that
sup
g∈C(x)
inf
Z∈Q
G
(
Z,E
[
ZU (ε+ g)
])
= sup
g∈C(x)
inf
Z∈Qt(c)
G
(
Z,E
[
ZU (ε+ g)
])
. (27)
Next, as U(ε + ·) is bounded from below and Qt(c) is UI due to Assumption 2, an application
of Fatou’s Lemma yields Z → E[ZU(ε + g)], g ∈ C(x), lower semicontinuous with respect to a.s.
convergence on Qt(c). As Qt,T is UI, that is equivalent to lower semicontinuity with respect to con-
vergence in L1. As the functional is convex (affine) that, in turn, implies weak lower semicontinuity.
Since G is jointly lower semicontinuous and quasiconvex it, thus, follows that
Z → G
(
Z,E
[
ZU (ε+ g)
])
, g ∈ C(x), (28)
is weakly lower semicontinuous and quasiconvex. Furthermore, as established above, it holds that
g → G
(
Z,E
[
ZU (ε+ g)
])
, Z ∈ Q, (29)
is quasiconcave. Recall that C(x) is convex. Moreover,
G(λZ + (1− λ)Z¯, t) ≤ max{G(Z, t), G(Z¯, t)} ≤ c,
for Z, Z¯ ∈ Qt(c). Hence, Qt(c) is also convex. The latter set is also weakly compact due to
Assumption 2. Given the properties of the mappings defined in (28) and (29), respectively, we
might thus apply Sion’s minimax theorem (cf. [49]). This yields,
sup
g∈C(x)
inf
Z∈Qt(c)
G
(
Z,E
[
ZU (ε+ g)
])
= inf
Z∈Qt(c)
sup
g∈C(x)
G
(
Z,E
[
ZU (ε+ g)
])
. (30)
Note that
inf
Z∈Q
sup
g∈C(x)
G
(
Z,E
[
ZU (ε+ g)
])
≤ inf
Z∈Qt(c)
sup
g∈C(x)
G
(
Z,E
[
ZU (ε+ g)
])
≤ u(x+ ε),
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where the first inequality is trivial and the second follows from (30) combined with (27). Hence, by
use of the same argument as above, the set Qt(c) in the right hand side of (30) can be substituted
for the set Q. That is to say,
sup
g∈C(x)
inf
Z∈Q
G
(
Z,E
[
ZU (ε+ g)
])
= inf
Z∈Q
sup
g∈C(x)
G
(
Z,E
[
ZU (ε+ g)
])
. (31)
For the case when U : R+ → R+, this completes the proof of part i).
For the case when G(Z, ·) is concave, a straight-forward argument yields u(x) concave. According
to (12) it is also finite. Consequently, it is continuous as a concave function is continuous on the
interior of the set where it is finite (cf. Theorem 10.1 in [45]). On the other hand, since the
expression on the left-hand-side in (31) clearly is smaller than u(x+ ε), it follows that
u(x+ ε) ≥ inf
Z∈Q
sup
g∈C(x)
G
(
Z,E
[
ZU (g)
])
≥ sup
g∈C(x)
inf
Z∈Q
G
(
Z,E
[
ZU (g)
])
= u(x). (32)
Since u(x) is (upper semi-) continuous, the result then follows by letting εց 0.
Next, according to Assumption 1, Qf 6= ∅. Since G has an asymptotic maximum in the sense of
Definition 1, this implies that the set Q on the right-hand side in (15) can be replaced by the set
Qf . For Q ∈ Qf , Lemma 1 applies. Hence, use of part i), the fact that G(Z, ·) is non-decreasing
and the duality relations between uZ(x) and vZ(y) given in Lemma 1, yields
u(x) = inf
Z∈Qf
G
(
Z, uZ(x)
)
= inf
Z∈Qf
G
(
Z, inf
y>0
(vZ(y) + xy)
)
= inf
y>0
inf
Z∈Qf
G
(
Z, vZ(y) + xy
)
.
Given the definition of v(y;x), it thus only remains to show that
inf
Z∈Qf
G
(
Z, vZ(y) + xy
)
= inf
Z∈Q
G
(
Z, vZ(y) + xy
)
=: v(y;x). (33)
The inequality ”≥” follows as Qf ⊆ Q. Without loss of generality, assume v(y;x) < ∞ and let
Q˜ := {Z ∈ Q : vZ(y) <∞)}. Clearly the set Q on the right-hand side of (33) can then be replaced
by Q˜. On the other hand, vZ(y) < ∞ implies that uZ(x) < ∞. Hence, Q˜ ⊆ Qf which yields the
inequality ”≤”.
Part ii) Let
H(Z, h) := G(Z,E[ZV (h/Z)] + xy).
According to Lemma 3.7 in [48], (Z, h) → E[ZV (h/Z)] is lower semicontinuous. Hence, since
G is jointly lower semicontinuous, it follows that so is (Z, h) → H(Z, h). Furthermore, since
(z, y) → zV (y/z) is convex, G(Z, ·) non-decreasing and G jointly quasiconvex, it follows that
(Z, h)→ H(Z, h) is jointly quasiconvex. Indeed, let Zt = tZ0 + (1− t)Z1 and ht = th0 + (1− t)h1.
Then,
H(Zt, ht) = G(Zt,E[ZtV (ht/Zt)] + xy)
≤ G(Zt, tE[Z0V (h0/Z0)] + (1− t)E[Z1V (h1/Z1)] + xy) ≤ H(Z0, h0) ∨H(Z1, h1).
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Let (Zn, hn) ∈ Q×D(y) be an optimizing sequence such that
G
(
Zn,E [ZnV (hn/Zn)] + xy
)
ց
n→∞
v(y;x) <∞. (34)
Note that
E[ZV (h/Z)] + xy ≥ U(x), (35)
for all Z ∈ Q and h ∈ D(y). Indeed, as V is convex, use of Jensen’s inequality yields
E
[
ZV (h/Z)
]
= E
[
ZV (h/Z11Z>0)
]
≥ V
(
E [Zh/Z11Z>0]
)
= V
(
E [h11Z>0]
)
≥ V (y),
as V is decreasing and h ∈ D(y) which implies that E[h11Z>0] ≤ E[h] ≤ y. The fact that G(Z, ·) is
non-decreasing combined with (34) and (35), then yields
c˜ := lim sup
n→∞
G
(
Zn, U(x)
)
<∞
and w.l.o.g., we can assume that Zn ∈ {Z ∈ Q : G(Z,U(x)) ≤ c˜ + 1}. That is to say, that
Zn ∈ Qt(c), for t := U(x) and c := c˜+ 1.
Applying twice the Komlos Lemma, yields a sequence (Z˜n, h˜n) ∈ conv{(Zn, hn), (Zn+1, hn+1), ...}
which converges P-a.s. to some (Z0, h0). Since Qt(c) and D(y) both are convex, (Z˜n, h˜n) ∈ Qt(c)×
D(y). Furthermore, since Qt(c) is uniformly integrable (as it is weakly compact) and D(y) is closed
in L0 according to Proposition 3.1 in [32], it follows that (Z0, h0) ∈ Qt(c)×D(y). Moreover, use of
the quasiconvexity yields
H(Z˜n, h˜n) = H
(∑
k≥n
λkZk,
∑
k≥n
λkhk
)
≤ max
k≥n
H(Zk, hk) = H(Zn, hn)ց v(y).
Hence, (Z˜n, h˜n) is also an optimizing sequence. Consequently, by use of the lower semicontinuity,
it follows that
H(Z0, h0) ≤ lim inf
n→∞
H(Z˜n, h˜n) = v(y),
which proves that the optimum is attained for (Z0, h0).
Next, suppose (Z˜1, h˜1) is another optimal pair. Let ht := th˜1+(1− t)h˜0 and Zt := tZ˜1+(1− t)Z˜0,
t ∈ [0, 1]. As (Z, h)→ E[ZV (h/Z)] is convex and G jointly quasiconvex, it thus follows that
G(Zt,E [ZtV (ht/Zt)] + xy)
≤ G (Zt, tE [Z1V (h1/Z1)] + (1− t)E [Z0V (h0/Z0)] + xy)
≤ max
{
G (Z1,E [Z1V (h1/Z1)] + xy) , G (Z0,E [Z0V (h0/Z0)] + xy)
}
= v(y),
due to the optimality of (Z˜1, h˜1) and (Z˜0, h˜0), respectively. Hence, also (ht, Zt) is optimal. We
proceed as in the proof of Lemma 4.3 in [47]. Note that for t ∈ (0, 1), {Zt > 0} = {Z0 > 0}∪{Z1 >
0}. Also note that according to (25) in [47], the ration ht/Zt, does not depend on t. Hence, there
exists a random variable YT ≥ 0 and a sequence Z¯1, Z¯2, ... such that:
(a) P[Z¯n] tends to the maximum P-probability for the support of any optimal Z;
(b) {Z¯1 > 0} ⊆ {Z¯2 > 0} ⊆ ...;
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(c) for each n, h¯n := YT Z¯n ∈ D(y) and (h¯n, Z¯n) is optimal.
By use of a Komlos-type argument, we may assume that Z¯n converge P-a.s. to some Z¯ ∈ Q. Then
h¯ := YT Z¯ ∈ D(y) by Proposition 3.1 in [32] (cf. (40) below). As above, it follows that (h¯, Z¯) is
optimal and, clearly, it is maximal.
Next, we prove Theorem 3 which establishes the existence of a saddle point and the link between
the primal and dual solutions.
Proof of Theorem 3. Part i) In order to verify the first statement, it remains to show that the
infimum on the right hand side in (15) is attained. To this end, note that since U ≥ 0, G is jointly
lower semicontinuous and quasiconvex and the operation of point-wise supremum preserves lower
semicontinuity and quasiconvexity, it follows that
Z → sup
g∈C(x)
G
(
Z,E
[
ZU(g)
])
, (36)
is lower semicontinuous and quasiconvex. Next, let Zn ∈ Q be a sequence such that
G
(
Zn, uZn(x)
)
ց u(x). (37)
As uZn(x) ≥ U(x), for all n and G(Z, ·) is increasing, it follows that
c˜ := lim sup
n→∞
G
(
Zn, U(x)
)
<∞.
Hence, w.l.o.g., we may assume Zn ∈ Qt(c) with t := U(x) and c = c˜ + 1. Application of Komlos
Lemma, yields a sequence Z˜n ∈ conv{Zn, Zn+1, ...} which converges P-a.s. to some Z0. Since
Qt(c) is convex, Z˜n ∈ Qt(c), n = 1, 2, .... Furthermore, since Qt(c) is uniformly integrable (as it is
weakly compact), it follows that Z0 ∈ Qt(c). Moreover, as in the proof of Theorem 2 part iii), the
quasiconvexity implies that also Zn is an optimizing sequence. Use of the lower-semicontinuity of
the mapping in (36), then yields that the infimum is attained for Z0.
Part ii) Let g˜ and Z˜ be a saddle-point for the primal problem. Let y∗ > 0 such that the infimum
for the auxiliary conjugacy relations with respect to Z˜ are attained for y∗. Then, it follows that
u(x) = G
(
Z˜, u
Z˜
(x)
)
= G
(
Z˜, v
Z˜
(y∗) + xy∗
)
.
Hence, the infimum in (16) is attained for y∗. Next, let (Ẑ, gˆ) be any solution to the dual problem
corresponding to y∗. Since G(Z, ·) is non-decreasing, use of the assumptions and Lemma 1 yields
u(x) = v(y∗;x) = G
(
Zˆ, v
Zˆ
(y∗) + xy∗
)
≥ G
(
Zˆ, u
Zˆ
(x)
)
≥ u(x). (38)
Hence, we have equality which, in turn, implies that
u(x) = G
(
Zˆ, u
Zˆ
(x)
)
≥ G
(
Zˆ,E
[
ZˆU(Xˆ)
])
≥ inf
Z∈Q
G
(
Z,E
[
ZU(Xˆ)
])
= u(x).
Consequently, (Q̂, X̂) is a saddle point for the primal problem.
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Next, from the definition of Y(y), it follows that E[XTYT ] ≤ xy, for X ∈ X (x) and Y ∈ Y(y).
Thus, it follows that
G
(
Zˆ,E
[
ZˆV (Yˆ /Zˆ) + XˆYˆ
])
−G
(
Zˆ,E
[
ZˆU(Xˆ)
])
= G
(
Zˆ,E
[
ZˆV (Yˆ /Zˆ)
]
+ E
[
XˆYˆ
])
− u(x)
≤ G
(
Zˆ,E
[
ZˆV (Yˆ /Zˆ)
]
+ xy
)
− u(x)
= v(y∗;x)− u(x) = 0.
Since G(Z, ·) strictly increasing, this implies that
EQˆ
[
V (Yˆ /Zˆ) + XˆYˆ /Zˆ
]
≤ EQˆ
[
U(Xˆ)
]
.
On the other hand V (Yˆ /Zˆ) + XˆYˆ /Zˆ ≥ U(Xˆ), Qˆ-a.s. Consequently, V (Yˆ /Zˆ) + XˆYˆ /Zˆ = U(Xˆ)
Qˆ-a.s. and, thus, it follows that Xˆ = I(Yˆ /Zˆ), Qˆ-a.s.
4.4 Further remarks on the auxiliary problem
We conclude with some further remarks on the auxiliary value functions.
Remark 4. Let Yˆ(y) the set of all positive Q-supermartingales such that Y0 = y and XY is a
Q-supermartingale for all X ∈ X (1). Then, as shown in Lemma 4.2 in [47], it holds that
vQ(y) = inf
Y ∈Yˆ(y)
EQ
[
V (YT )
]
.
Indeed, let 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T . For Yˆ ∈ Yˆ(y) and X ∈ X (1),
XsYˆs ≥ E
Q
[
XtYˆt|Fs
]
=
1
Zs
E
[
XtYˆtZt|Fs
]
, P-a.s. on {Zs > 0}.
On {Zs = 0}, it holds that Zt = 0 P-a.s. It follows that XYˆ Z is a P-supermartingale and hence
that Yˆ Z ∈ Y(y). Conversely, let Y ∈ Y(y). Then, Q-a.s. for each X ∈ X (1),
EQ
[
Xt
Yt
Zt
|Fs
]
=
1
Zs
E
[
ZtXt
Yt
Zt
11Zt>0|Fs
]
≤
1
Zs
E
[
XtYt11Zs>0|Fs
]
≤
XsYs
Zs
11Zs>0.
Hence, XY/Z is a Q-supermartingale, for all x ∈ X (x) and Y/Z11Z>0 ∈ Yˆ(y).
Remark 5. For Q≪ P, let XQ(x) the set of wealth-processes such that X0 ≤ x and Xt ≥ 0, Q-a.s.
on t ∈ [0, T ] and YQ(y) the set of all positive Q-supermartingales such that Y0 = y and XY is a
Q-supermartingale for all X ∈ XQ(1). Then, consider the following two problems
u˜Q(x) = sup
X∈XQ(x)
EQ
[
U(XpiT )
]
and v˜Q(y) = inf
Y ∈YQ(y)
EQ
[
V (YT )
]
,
where inf ∅ := ∞. Note that u˜(x) is the standard investment problem with respect to Q as it is
normally defined. However, since it is not clear whether St satisfies NFLVR with respect to Q, it
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is (a priori) not clear whether u˜ and v˜ are each others conjugate. Also note that X (x) ⊆ XQ(x),
which, in turn, implies that YQ(y) ⊆ Yˆ(y). Hence,
u(x) ≤ u˜(x) and vQ(y) ≤ v˜Q(y). (39)
In particular, the condition that v˜Q(y) <∞, Q ∈ Q, is therefore a sufficient condition for Theorem
1 to hold. For Q ∼ P, (39) holds with equality. The question whether there are models Q≪ P, for
which the inequality is strict is left for future study. We limit ourselves to note that given that the
market is continuous, equality may in fact hold under rather weak conditions. Regardless of this,
under the additional assumption (18), it holds for the variational case (i.e. when G(Q, t) = γ(Q)+t)
that
v(y;x) = inf
Q∈Q
G
(
Q, v˜Q(y) + xy
)
,
and, in consequence, Theorem 2 holds also with vQ(y) replaced by v˜Q(y). Indeed, v(y;x) = v(y)+xy,
where
v(y) = inf
Z∈Qe
(
vZ(y) + γ(Z)
)
= inf
Z∈Qe
(
v˜Z(y) + γ(Z)
)
≥ inf
Z∈Q
(
v˜Z(y) + γ(Z)
)
.
Here the first equality follows from Lemma 4.4 in [47]. Since vQ(y) ≤ v˜Q(y), Q ∈ Q, equality
follows.
Appendix
We here provide the proof of Lemma 1. We stress that the Lemma follows by minor modifications
in the respective proofs in [32, 33]. Specifically, in the proofs of Lemmata 3.4 and 3.5 in [32] and
Lemma 1 in [33]. For completeness, the details are presented next. For alternative arguments, see
the further discussion in Section 4.1.
In preparation for the proof, note that the assumption uQ(x) < ∞ implies that the expectation
operator is defined in the standard way (cf. page 5). It also immediately follows that
uZ(x) = sup
g∈C(x)
E[ZU(g)] and vZ(y) = inf
h∈D(y)
E[ZV (h/Z)],
where the set of random variables C(x) andD(y) are defined by C(x) := {g ∈ L0+ : g ≤ XT , P-a.s., X ∈
X (x)} and D(y) = {h ∈ L0+ : h ≤ Z, P-a.s., Z ∈ Y(y)}. Moreover, according to Proposition 3.1 in
[32], it holds that
g ∈ C(x) if and only if E[gh] ≤ xy, for all h ∈ D(y). (40)
Proof of Lemma 1. Consider the mapping Bn × D(y) → R, (g, h) → E[ZU(g)− gh], where Bn :=
{g ∈ L0+ : 0 ≤ g ≤ n}. The set D(y) is convex and since the unit ball in L
∞ is weak*-compact,
so is Bn. Furthermore, while the above mapping is concave in g, it is linear and continuous in h,
this for the weak*-topology on L0. Hence, the minimax theorem (cf. Theorem 2.7.1 in [2]) can be
applied in order to obtain
sup
g∈Bn
inf
h∈D(y)
E[ZU(g)− gh] = inf
h∈D(y)
sup
g∈Bn
E[ZU(g)− gh]. (41)
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Next, (40) implies that
lim
n→∞
sup
g∈Bn
inf
h∈D(y)
E[ZU(g)− gh] = sup
x>0
(
uZ(x)− xy
)
. (42)
Indeed, we first see that (40) implies that infh∈D(y) E[ZU(g) − gh] ≥ E[ZU(g)] − xy. Taking the
supremum over g ∈ Bn and g ∈ C(x) ∩ Bn on the left- and right-hand side, respectively and,
then, in turn, letting n → ∞ yields the inequality ≥ in (42). Next, we fix n and let g ∈ Bn and
x∗ := inf{x > 0 : g ∈ C(x)}. Without loss of generality, let x∗ > 0. Then it holds that g ∈ C(x∗+ε)
but g 6∈ C(x∗ − ε). Thus, using (40), it follows that
inf
h∈D(y)
E[ZU(g)− gh] < E[ZU(g)]− (x∗ − ε)y
≤ uZ(x
∗ + ε)− (x∗ + ε)y + 2εy ≤ 2εy + sup
x>0
(
uZ(x)− xy
)
.
Letting εց 0, yields that for g ∈ Bn and n ∈ N,
inf
h∈D(y)
E[ZU(g)− gh] ≤ sup
x>0
(
uZ(x)− xy
)
.
This completes the proof of (42).
Next, let Vn(y) = sup0≤x≤n
(
U(x)− xy
)
and note that
sup
g∈Bn
E[ZU(g)− gh] = E
[
sup
0<x≤n
{ZU(x)− xh}
]
= E
[
sup
0<x≤n
{(ZU(x)− xh) 11Z>0}
]
= E[ZJn(h/Z)], (43)
where it was used that sup0<x<n{ZU(x)− xh} = 0 on {Z = 0}. Therefore, it holds that
inf
h∈D(y)
sup
g∈Bn
E[ZU(g)− gh] = inf
h∈D(y)
E[ZJn(h/Z)] =: v
n
Z(y). (44)
Combining (41), (42) and (44), we easily see that in order to show the first conjugacy relation in
i), it only remains to show that
lim
n→∞
vnZ(y) = v(y), y > 0. (45)
To this end, let hn ∈ D(y) be a sequence such that
lim
n→∞
vnZ(y) = lim
n→∞
E [ZV n (hn/Z)] .
According to Komlos Lemma, there exist h˜n ∈ conv(hn, hn+1, ...) converging P-a.s. to some h which
belongs to D(y) as the latter set, according to Proposition 3.1 in [32], is closed under convergence
in probability. Moreover, as h→ zJ(h/z) is convex (in [48], it is verified that also (y, z)→ zV (y/z)
is convex, this seems not needed here though) and V n ≤ V m, m ≥ n, it follows that
inf
m≥n
E
[
ZVm
(
h˜m/Z
)]
≤ E
[
ZV n
(
h˜n/Z
)]
≤
∑
m≥n
λmE
[
ZV n
(
hm/Z
)]
≤ sup
m≥n
E [ZVm (hm/Z)] .
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Hence, it holds that
lim
n→∞
vnZ(y) = lim sup
n→∞
E [ZV n (hn/Z)] ≥ lim inf
n→∞
E
[
ZV n
(
h˜n/Z
)]
.
Consequently, if it can be shown that the set
{
ZV −n (h˜n/Z) : n ∈ N
}
is UI, then use of Fatou’s
Lemma yields
lim
n→∞
vnZ(y) ≥ lim inf
n→∞
E[ZV n(h˜n/Z)] ≥ E[ZV
n(h/Z)] ≥ vZ(y),
where the last inequality follows as h ∈ D(y). Since, vnZ(y) ≤ vZ(y), this concludes the proof of the
first conjugacy relation.
It remains to establish the uniform integrability
{
ZV −n (h˜n/Z) : n ∈ N
}
. To this end, note that for
I(y) ≤ n, it holds that Vn(y) = V (y). As V −n is increasing in y and decreasing in n, it thus follows
that
ZV −n (h˜n/Z) ≤ ZV
−(h˜n/Z) + ZV
−
1 (U
′(1)).
Next, we note that Z is integrable. According to Lemma 3.6 in [48], for a set Q ⊂ {Q≪ P} which
is UI, it holds that the set {ZV −(h/Z) : h ∈ D(y), Z ∈ Q} is UI. Hence, the uniform integrability
of {ZV −(h/Z) : h ∈ D(y)} follows as a special case thereof. Hence,
{
ZV −n (h˜n/Z) : n ∈ N
}
is UI
which completes the proof of the first conjugacy.
The reverse conjugacy follows directly from the first one. Indeed, due to assumption uZ(x0) < ∞
for some x0 > 0. Hence, it is finite for all x > 0 and, furthermore, it is concave. Consequently, the
reverse conjugacy follows from Theorem 12.2 in [45].
Next, we turn to the proof of statement ii). Due to the conjugacy relations in i), the assumption
that vZ(y) <∞ is equivalent to (cf. Note 1 in [33])
lim
xր∞
uz(x)/x = 0. (46)
Hence, the Q-uniform integrability of (U+(gn)), n ≥ 1, can be established as in Lemma 1 in [33].
For completeness, we highlight the main steps. To this end, we assume contrary to the claim that
the sequence is not Q- uniformly integrable. Then, (passing if necessary to a subsequence), one can
find α > 0 and a disjoint sequence (An)n≥1 of (Ω,F) such that, for n ≥ 1,
EQ[U+(gn)11An ] ≥ α.
Define the sequence of random variables (g˜n)n≥1 by
g˜n = x0 +
n∑
k=1
gn11An ,
where x0 := inf{x > 0 : U(x) ≥ 0}. For any h ∈ D(1), it then holds that under P
EP[g˜nh] ≤ x0 +
n∑
k=1
EP[g˜nh] ≤ x0 + nx.
Hence, g˜n ∈ C(x0 + nx). On the other hand, it holds that under Q
EQ[U(g˜n)] ≥
n∑
k=1
EQ[U+(g˜n)11An ] ≥ αn,
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and therefore,
lim sup
x→∞
uZ(x)
x
≥ lim sup
x→∞
EQ[U(g˜n)]
x0 + nx
≥ lim sup
x→∞
αn
x0 + nx
= α > 0.
This contradicts the assumptions (cf. (46)) which concludes the proof.
References
[1] E. Anderson, L.P. Hansen, and T.J. Sargent. A quartet of semigroups for model specification,
robustness, prices of risk, and model detection. Journal of the European Economic Association,
1(1):68–123, 2003.
[2] J.P. Aubin. Applied Functional Analysis. Wiley-Interscience, 2000.
[3] J. Bion-Nadal. Time consistent dynamic risk processes. Stoch. Process. Appl., 119(2):633–654,
2009.
[4] G. Bordigoni, A. Matoussi, and M. Schweizer. A stochastic control approach to a robust utility
maximization problem. Stochastic analysis and applications, 2:125–151, 2007.
[5] C. Burgert and L. Ru¨schendorf. Optimal consumption strategies under model uncertainty.
Statistics & Decisions, 23:1–14, 2005.
[6] S. Cerreia-Vioglio, F. Maccheroni, M. Marinacci, and L. Montrucchio. Complete monotone
quasiconcave duality. Mathematics of Operations Research, 36:321–339, 2011.
[7] S. Cerreia-Vioglio, F. Maccheroni, M. Marinacci, and L. Montrucchio. Uncertainty averse
preferences. Journal of Economic Theory, 146:1275–1330, 2011.
[8] Z. Chen and L. Epstein. Ambiguity, risk, and asset returns in continuous time. Econometrica,
70(4):1403–1443, 2002.
[9] F. Delbaen. Coherent risk measures on general probability spaces. In Advances in finance and
stochastics, pages 1–37. Springer, 2002.
[10] F. Delbaen, S. Peng, and E.R. Gianin. Representation of the penalty term of dynamic concave
utilities. Finance Stochastics, 14:449–472, 2010.
[11] S. Drapeau and M. Kupper. Risk preferences and their robust representation. Mathematics of
Operations Research, 38:28–62, 2013.
[12] Daniel Ellsberg. Risk, ambiguity, and the savage axioms. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
pages 643–669, 1961.
[13] W. Faidi, A. Matoussi, and M. Mnif. Maximization of recursive utilities: A dynamic maximum
principle approach. SIAM J. Financial Mathematics, 2(1):1014–1041, 2011.
[14] H. Fo¨llmer and I. Penner. Convex risk measures and the dynamics of their penalty functions.
Statistics & Decisions, 24(1):61–96, 2006.
[15] H. Fo¨llmer and A. Schied. Convex measures of risk and trading constraints. Finance and
Stochastics, 6:429–447, 2002.
23
[16] H. Fo¨llmer and A. Schied. Stochastic finance, an introduction in discrete time. Walter de
Gruyter, 2nd edition, 2004.
[17] H. Fo¨llmer, A. Schied, and S. Weber. Robust preferences and robust portfolio choice. Handbook
of Numerical Analysis, 15:29–87, 2009.
[18] Hans Fo¨llmer and Peter Leukert. Efficient hedging: cost versus shortfall risk. Finance and
Stochastics, 4(2):117–146, 2000.
[19] M. Fritelli and M. Maggis. Dual representation of quasi-convex conditional maps. Siam J.
Financial Math., 2:357–382, 2011.
[20] M. Fritelli and M. Maggis. Complete duality for quasiconvex dynamic risk measures on modules
of the Lp-type. ArXiv:1201.1788v2. 2012.
[21] M. Fritelli and E. Rosazza Gianin. Putting order in risk measures. J. Bank. Finance, 26:1473–
1486, 2002.
[22] I. Gilboa and D. Schmeidler. Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior. Journal of
Mathematical Economics, 18:141–153, 1989.
[23] L.P. Hansen and T.J. Sargent. Robust control and model uncertainty. American Economic
Review, 91:60–66, 2001.
[24] D. Herna´ndez-Herna´ndez and A. Schied. Robust utility maximization in a stochastic factor
model. Statistics & Decisions, 24(1):109–125, 2006.
[25] D. Herna´ndez-Herna´ndez and A. Schied. A control approach to robust utility maximization
with logarithmic utility and time-consistent penalties. Stochastic Processes and their Applica-
tions, 117(8):980–1000, 2007.
[26] D. Herna´ndez-Herna´ndez and A. Schied. Robust maximization of consumption with logarith-
mic utility. American Control Conference, pages 1120–1123, 2007.
[27] M. Jeanblanc, A. Matoussi, and A. Ngoupeyou. Robust utility maximization in a discontinuous
filtration. ArXiv:1201.2690v3. 2012.
[28] I. Karatzas and C. Kardaras. The nume´raire portfolio in semimartingale financial models.
Finance ans Stochastics, 11:447–493, 2007.
[29] P. Klibanoff, M. Marinacci, and S. Mukerji. A smooth model of decision making under amibi-
guity. Econometrica, 73(6):1849–1892, 2005.
[30] S. Klo¨ppel and M. Schweizer. Dynamic utility indifference valuation via convex risk measures.
Mathematical Finance, 17(4):599–627, 2007.
[31] F. Knight. Risk, Uncertainty and Profit. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1921.
[32] D. Kramkov and W. Schachermayer. The asymptotic elasticity of utility functions and optimal
investments in incomplete markets. Annals of Applied Probability, 9:904–950, 1999.
[33] D. Kramkov and W. Schachermayer. Necessary and sufficient conditions in the problem of
optimal investment in incomplete markets. Annals of Applied Probability, 13:1504–1516, 2003.
[34] R.J.A. Laeven and M.A. Stadje. Robust portfolio choice and indifference valuation:
http://alexandria.tue.nl/repository/books/733411.pdf. 2012.
24
[35] A. Lazrak and M.C. Quenez. A generalized stochastic differential utility. Mathematics of
Operations Research, 28(1):154–180, 2003.
[36] F. Maccheroni, M. Marinacci, and A. Rustichini. Ambiguity aversion, robustness, and the
variational representation of preferences. Econometrica, 74:1447–1498, 2006.
[37] E. Mastrogiacomo and E. Rosazza Gianin. Portfolio optimization with quasiconvex risk mea-
sures. http://ssrn.com/abstract=2282472. 2013.
[38] R.C. Merton. Lifetime portfolio selection under uncertainty: the continuous time case. The
Review of Economics and Statistics, 51:247–257, 1969.
[39] R.C. Merton. Optimum consumption and portfolio rules in a continuous-time model. J.
Economic Theory, 3(4):373–413, 1971.
[40] M. Mu¨ller. Market completion and Robust utility maximization. Dissertation, Humboldt Uni-
versita¨t zu Berlin, 2005.
[41] M. Nutz. Utility maximization under model uncertainty in discrete time, ArXiv:1307.3597v1.
2013.
[42] K. Owari. Robust exponential hedging in a brownian setting. Mimeo, Hitotsubashi University,
2009.
[43] S. Peng. Dynamically consistent nonlinear evaluations and expectations.
ArXiv:math/0501415v1. 2005.
[44] M.C. Quenez. Optimal portfolio in a multiple-priors model. In Seminar on Stochastic Analysis,
Random Fields and Applications IV, pages 291–321. Springer, 2004.
[45] R.T. Rockafellar. Convex Analysis. Princeton University Press, 1970.
[46] Leonard J Savage. The Foundations of Statistics. John Wiley & Sons Inc., New York, 1954.
[47] A. Schied. Optimal investments for risk- and ambiguity-averse preferences: a duality approach.
Finance and Stochastics, 11:107–129, 2007.
[48] A. Schied and C.T. Wu. Duality theory for optimal investments under model uncertainty.
Statistics & Decisions, 23(3):199–217, 2005.
[49] M. Sion. On general minimax theorems. Pacifc Journal of Mathematics, 8:171–176, 1958.
[50] C. Skiadas. Robust control and recursive utility. Finance and Stochastics, 7(4):475–489, 2003.
[51] T. Strzalecki. Axiomatic foundations of multiplier preferences. Econometrica, 2011.
[52] J. Von Neumann and O. Morgenstern. Theory of games and economic behavior (commemorative
edition). Princeton university press, 2007.
[53] W. Wittmu¨ß. Robust optimization of consumption with random endowment. Stochastics An
International Journal of Probability and Stochastic Processes, 80(5):459–475, 2008.
